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stream need not be discernible to presume one existed was consistent
with the legislative purpose to give the Division jurisdiction over stream
obstructions. The court explained that Frank's proposed interpretation, that a stream must be in existence immediately before an obstruction is built, would allow a person to avoid the statute's reach and nullify the Divisions authority by modifying a stream's bed and banks prior
to building the obstruction.
Finally, upon granting the Division deference as to the presumption that a stream could exist anywhere in a watershed, the court found
that Frank failed to meet his burden of establishing that a stream did
not exist. In fact, the court found that the Division provided ample
evidence, based on physical and hydrological analysis of Frank's property, that a well-defined stream or channel likely did exist at some
point. For the foregoing reasons, the court affirmed the district court
ruling, holding that the Kansas Division of Water Resources correctly
determined that Frank had to obtain a permit under the Kansas stream
obstruction law.
Jeff McGaughran
Frick Farm Prop., L.P. v. Kan. Dep't of Agric., 190 P.3d 983 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2008) (holding that the Department of Agriculture, Division of
Water Resources ("DWR"), can terminate a private owner's water rights
if, after DWR presents a verified report of nonuse, the owner fails to
meet its burden of showing either (1) lawful and beneficial use of the
water within 5 years, or (2) due and sufficient cause for nonuse).
In November 2002, Frick Farm Properties ("Frick Farm") purchased a water right from Bernard Debes ("Debes") who had previously owned the water right since 1982. In January 2003, Frick Farm
received notice that no one had used the water right in 3 years. In
January 2004, Frick Farm received another letter from Division of Water Resources ("DWR") stating that no one had used Frick Farm's water
right in 3 years and that DWR would terminate the water right if the
period of nonuse continued for 5 years. In response, Frick Farm sent
DWR a letter stating that Debes had been unable to use the water right
because of his poor health and that Frick Farm had only possessed the
right since October 2002. In August 2004, Frick Farm received a letter
and a draft verified report from DWR advising Frick Farm that DWR
would use the draft verified report as prima facie evidence to terminate
Frick Farm's water right. However, the letter gave Frick Farm another
opportunity to report a reason for the nonuse of its water right. In
October 2004, DWR sent a verified report to Frick Farm stating that
DWR had found no valid cause excusing the nonuse from 1985 to
2003. At a subsequent hearing, DWR concluded that Frick Farm had
abandoned and forfeited the water right by failing to establish due and
sufficient cause for the nonuse.
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The Secretary of Agriculture denied Frick Farm's petition for administrative review, and the Kansas District Court affirmed the DWR
order. The district court reasoned that DWR correctly interpreted and
applied the law when terminating the water right. Additionally, the
district court found that the verified report of nonuse constituted substantial evidence supporting DWR's ruling. Upon appeal to the Kansas
Court of Appeals, the court affirmed the district court's ruling terminating the water right.
Frick Farm argued that its water right is equivalent to a property
right that the State could not terminate without first proving every
element of the water right's forfeiture. However, the court held that
the State, which created the property right to the water, can place conditions on the retention of that right. Specifically, the court cited the
Water Appropriation Act as explicitly granting the State authority to
terminate any owner's water right if the owner fails to make beneficial
use of the water for 5 successive years, and is also unable to provide
due and sufficient cause for the nonuse. Debes and Frick Farm failed
to make beneficial use of the water right and did not provide sufficient
cause for nonuse. Furthermore, because DWR's letters gave Frick
Farm sufficient notice and DWR held an abandonment hearing pursuant to statutory procedures, the court held that the state did not violate
Frick Farm's due process in terminating its water rights.
Frick Farm also argued that DWR relied exclusively on the verified
report and did not support its forfeiture claim with additional evidence. The court, however, agreed with DWR's argument that the
verified report was prima facie evidence of nonuse that, if uncontradicted, was sufficient to sustain a verdict. The court reasoned that after
DWR presents a verified report, the owner of the water right has the
burden to show either lawful and beneficial use of the water or due
and sufficient cause for its nonuse. Because Frick Farm established
neither of these elements, the court held that substantial evidence existed to support the termination of Frick Farm's water right.
The court affirmed the DWR's order terminating Frick Farm's water right because DWR followed the relevant statutory procedures, did
not violate Frick Farm's due process fights, and presented substantial
evidence of Frick Farm's forfeiture.
MichaelEden
MONTANA
Bitterroot River Protective Ass'n v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., 2008
MT 377, 346 Mont. 507, 198 P.3d 219 (holding that the Montana Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act applies to Mitchell Slough
because it meets the definition of a "natural, perennial flowing
stream," and the Montana Stream Access Law applies to Mitchell
Slough because it meets the definition of a "natural water body").

